Neo-corporatist industrial relations and the economic crisis in West Germany by STREECK, Wolfgang
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
E U I  W O R K I N G  P A P E R  No. 97
NEO-CORPORATIST INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN WEST GERMANY
by
WOLFGANG STREECK
International Institute of Management 
Berlin
and
European University Institute 
Florence





























































































This paper should not be reproduced in whole 
or in part without the prior permission 
of the author
Wolfgang Streeck
Printed in Italy in March, 1984 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana




























































































OF n r ; . ! r r r  T  T n cL/TA'l J.Jji '.iO
PAGE
The Changing Balance of Power and Interests: 
IJeo-Corpor&tist Institutions under the Pressure 
o F trie I-üarîcet ..................................
Restoring Flexibility to a Bargained Econoiny.
Tuo Case of ARCED Cuarstabi .................
Tne Decomposition of Class Interests. Consequences 
of Unenploymient for Timide Union Organization ..........  23


























































































































































































Ilany different tilings - in fact, too many - have been labelled 
"neo-corporatist". Tills paper will be concerned exclusively with 
industrial relations, conceived in a wide sense as cor.prising the 
regulation not only of wages and conditions but also of (public and 
quasi-public) social policy and of the institutional framework v.lthin 
which the parties at the labour market interact. For the purposes of 
the argument, an industrial relation;; system will be called neo- 
corporatist if it regulates significant aspects of the exchange between 
capital and labour through bargained agreements between strong, 
encompassing class associations at the national or industrial level, and 
if such joint regulation takes place under procedural and political 
facilitation, conditional upon its substantive outcomes, by the state 
(ochi.itter, 19C3). The subject of the paper, then, is how neo- 
corporatist industrial relations systems thus defined, and the large 
interest aggregates and bargaining compacts that are their essential and 
characteristic constituents, are likely to react to a lasting economic 
crisis that is accompanied by high unemployment.
THE CHAliGIhG BALANCE OF POWER AND INTERESTS: NEO-CORPORATIST 
IITSTITUTIGNS UNDER THE PRESSURE OF HIE MARKET.
The inpacr of economic decline on neo-corporatist industrial 
relations Ivjk-j Iwsiri a subject of speculation since trie early 1970s 8for 
many others, see Lehnbruch, 1979; Panitch, 1979, Sabel, 1981). How that 
the crisis has finally arrived, we can see that its effects differ 
considerably from what was for long time accepted as received wisdom by 
nearly everybody, heo-corporatist industrial relations were regarded by 
many as "fair-weather systems", depending for their stability on 



























































































Their critical element was believed to be the trade unions whose "wage 
restraint" had to be rewarded by government cornnitments to an expensive 
social policy, aid by gradually increasing real wages. This required a 
growing economy, and failing this precondition, it was almost taken for 
granted that unions, under the pressure of their frustrated membership, 
would . (have to) refuse to be further "concerted" by tripartite 
agreements.
With hindsight, it is not difficult to see why this expectation was 
bound to be disasppointed. For one thing, the "incomes policy" view of 
neo-corporatism has always been one-sided and top-heavy, in the sense 
that it has essentially limited itself to the problem of demand 
management and distribution at national level, neglecting the central 
role of neo-corpora tint institutions on the supply side and at the 
workplace. Meo-corporatist demand management, to be more than a short­
lived political expedient, always needed to be supported by congenial 
institutions of interest accomodation at the workplace, and these tend 
to be conducive not just to consensus but also to high efficiency and 
superior productivity (Streeck, 1981b). It is not at all accidental 
that countries like Sweden, Austria and West Germany, in addition to 
having had relatively successful national incomes policies and peaceful 
industrial relations in the 1970s, are also characterized by highly 
flexible systems of manpower use at the point of production, with few if 
any "restrictive practices" and with high responsiveness to 
technological change (Pfotz, 1982; Jacobs et al., 1978). Che can build a 
complex argument around this and we will return to the point further 
down; what is important in the present context is that, Whatever 
"corrpensations" may or may not be gained from "political exchange" at 




























































































sustained, over a longer terra, if they arc underwritten by a productive
econony. To the extent that neo-corporatist institutions contribute to 
superior productivity, m i  oris - especially in countries, sectors or 
fins that depend heavily on exports - will find it hard in a crisis to
itaire their members abandon practices and structures of "class
cooperation" at the -workplace that constitute a competitive advantage in 
the international "job market".
The second factor that early speculations about the fate of neo- 
corporation in an economic crisis iiave overlooked, is that trade unions
iiave other stakes in neo-corporalist 
benefits of favourable economic
bargaining than just the material 
and social policy exchanges.
Organizational privileges iiave often been mentioned as one such 
additional pay-off (Streeck, 1932). However, more important for our 
argument in L'ne- fact that unions - and in particular those large, 
encompassing unions as typically Lake part in corporatist natiorud
bargaining - arc interested in the existence of institutions of 
industrial (self-) government that, are capable of creating and enforcing 
general and uniform regulations, riot just of wages but also of 
employment conditions in die widest sense. The reasons are in part 
ideological and in part organizational. The idea of "solidarity" 
demands that workers in economically weak regions, industries or firms 
should not have lessor suploymcnt protection, inferior training, weaker 
representation, harder working conditions, lower pensions, poorer access 
to health services etc. than workers in strong regions, industries or
firms. In organizational 
no. redistrccute at least 
..leiibert; to their' weaker
tenns, internally heterogeneous unions that do 
some of the bargaining power of their stronger 
ones, and that pern,it the forces of tire market




























































































groups, will sooner' or later have to face their own disintegration as 
collective actors. Central bargaining aid central agreements, and the 
assistance of the State and the legal system in making these "stick" in 
vastly different places of work, are indispensable for trade unions 
trying to develop a "strategic capacity" (Crouch, 1977). In so far as 
neo-corporatist arrangements support such capacity - and there is no 
doubt tiiat they do - trade unions cannot easily afford to abandon them, 
even if the substance of central regulations and their actual impact rnay 
be less than fully satisfactory for' them in changed economic 
c i reruns tances.
How does this corrpare to the interests of the second partner at the 
bargaining table, business? A central Leitmotiv of the "incomes policy 
tradition" of noo-corporatisl theory is the more or less explicit 
assumption of a built-in asymmetry in neo-corporatist industrial 
relations (Lehrrbruch, 1979 : 303). While there always was considerable 
discussion aid disagreement over the benefits of neo-corporatist 
cooperation for labour', it was widely accepted that capital gained 
significantly and unambiguously from trade union "v/age restraint". By 
and large, this resulted in an emerging consensus that the rewards of 
neo-corporatism were unequally distributed in favour of capital. If 
this was true, however, then there was no reason to even consider the 
possibility that centrifugal tendencies in established neo-corporatist 
systems might originate a.iong capital. V/age restraint, after all, was 
something that capitalists always have use for, and it seemed difficult 
"co imagine a situation in which capitalists might lose interest in an 




























































































again, at least tv» points were overlooked. Meo-corporatist 
incomes policy was, righcly or wrongly, explained as a device to make 
unions abstain from Tally exploiting an "excessive" amount of bargaining 
power - excessive in the sense that it may have yielded nominal wage 
increases iùgjier tlran the increase in productivity. But not much 
attention was paid to the possibility tnat, in an economic crisis and 
after a "withering away" of Keynesian economic policy, union bargaining 
power as such migjit drop back to a level that would render institutional 
constraints and negotiated restraint dispensable. If trade unions 
sir,ply lack the clout to "distort the market", why should erp loyers make 
any, even only symbolic, concessions to them for agreeing not to do so? 
Again with hlniisight, i-t seems that Iron the very logic of ( I k : 
prevailing incomes jxrlicy concept of rxro-corpora tism, one should (rave 
expected that when "wage restraint" is irposed on the unions by an 
adverse economic situation, neo-corporatism, conceived of as negotiated 
wage restraint, should lose much of its attraction to errp loyers.
Of courte, declining functional importance of neo-corporat is t 
institutions foi' capital may not Ire a sufficient reason to disband them 
- especially since they may again become useful after' tine economy has 
recovered. Cn tire other hand, it seems tlrat not only do the benefits of 
neo-corporatisn for capital decl ine in an economic crisis, but the costs 
inen at tiio tin* . floo-corporatist centraljzed bargaining 
typically produces comprehensive and uniform regulations of a wide range 
of aspects of the employment relationship, line economic burden that 
such regulations impose on employer's may be relatively easy to bear in 
periods of expansion; but as soon as the economy moves in a crisis, it 
is likely to become increasingly heavy. From the perspective of the 




























































































depends on fast and innovative reactions to changing market conditions.
But centrally negotiated regulations are by definition insensitive to 
the market situation of individual firms, and it is precisely this 
element of (relative) institutional autonomy that makes them such an 
inportent instrument for trade unions in protecting the interests of 
their members.
Neo-corporatism, that is to say, produces a body of (jointly 
agreed) central rules and regulations that, especially under critical 
economic conditions, is experienced by the individual firm as rigid, 
inflexible, and severely constraining its adaptive responses to market 
contingencies. Clearly, the "rules of the game" of neo-corporatist 
collective bargaining do not preclude revisions of existing regulations 
so cis to Lake into account changed economic conditions. In fact, 
pressing for such revisions is the first and "natural" response of 
employers associations to economic setbacks, and while it is true that 
neo-corporatist institutions are "sticky" - in the sense of having a 
logic of their' own that is different from that of tire market - there is 
a good chance that unions, weakened by the crisis and desperate to 
protect the principle of centralized joint regulation as such, will 
agree to considerable "downward flexibility" of wages and conditions.
In this, they may even be able to carry their members by presenting '
their concessions as a contribution to a reduction of unemployment.
Nevertheless, re-negotiation of existing agreements remains difficult, 
burdened with high uncertainty, and time-consuming, and it may in fact 
be too uncertain and too slow for firms that have to undergo rapid 
structural change. moreover, even a re-negotiated central agreement, 
with relatively favourable terms for employers, continues to impose 




























































































different market conditions and that are forced by the crisis to respond 
more closely than ever to their specific, rapidly changing environments.
It is at this point that the conflicting interests and options, in 
the crisis, of capital and organized labour with regard to the further 
operation of neo-corporaLisl institutions become most clearly apparent. 
For centralized, encompassing trade unions, disintegration of the neo- 
corporatist machinery of joint regulation would destroy their' strategic 
capacity for solidaristic interest representation aimed at protecting, 
as much as possible, the status of individual workers from the whims and 
uncertainties of the rnarkeL. For employers associations, given the 
decline of union bargaining power in the crisis, the same development 
would mean the realization of an important interest of their members - 
the interest in flexibility, "de-bureaucratization", higher autonomy in 
dealing with the uncertaint:ies of more competitive and volatile markets, 
etc. Employers therefore have an alternative, and in principle a 
preferred alternative, to re-negotiating existing agreements - which is 
letting the machinery of central negotiations fall into disuse and 
returning the regulation of the employment relationship to the market. 
This places them at a strategic advantage over their trade union 
adversaries for which the market becomes less rather than more 
acceptable a regulator of working conditions when the economy 
duel I, :;.
It is important to emphasize that this constellation of interests 
does not necessarily have to result in an abrupt, wholesale withdrawal 
of capital from neo-corporatist bargaining. The legal and procedural 
safeguards that typically protect corporatist institutions are not the 
only factor that makes a sudden withdrawal indeed unlikely. Existing 




























































































if only because nobody can lenow for certain what will replace them. 
Enployers associations, as distinct from their meihbers, undoubtedly do 
have an interest in central negotiations as such. Moreover, to the 
extent that neo-corporatist conflict management contributes to social 
peace and productivity at the workplace, even their members may not be 
willing to do without them. Anti-corporati st responses by capital to 
the crisis are therefore likely to be more subtle than the formal 
withdrawal of union recognition at the central bargaining level, and in 
fact they can be so without being less effective.
Mere again, it is useful to remind oneself of the fact that neo- 
corporatist industrial relations systems are multi-tier structures, and 
that the functional relationships and the structural linkages between 
their various levels constitute a central dimension of their 
development and evolution. Employers, in struggling against the 
constraints of centralized regulation, nay find that they can achieve 
their objective relatively easily by re-setting, in line with the 
changed balance of power, the institutional balance between the 
different levels of bargained interest accomodation. All that is needed 
for this are constant pressures inside and outside the various 
bargaining arenas for special regulations and exemptions for individual 
firms and industries, and for a general delegation of bargaining matter 
to the individual firm level. Superficially, this may not look much 
different from the routine re-negotiation of existing agreements in the 
light of new economic circumstances. In fact, however, it is the 
opposite of the corporatist "business as usual" in that it is bound to 
result in a gradual erosion of the practice and principle of centralized 




























































































meaningless for the workplace, and making the workplace increasingly 
autonomous vis-a-vis the central level.
For unions that have accomodated themselves to a neo-corporatist 
mode of operation, such a development must represent a fundamental 
political challenge. Mot only would they be deprived of the 
institutional preconditions for the kind of solidaristic, unified 
interest politics that they have to pursue for reasons of their 
organ!zational stability. They would also, as national, "external" 
unions, lose control over the main resource they have to sell in 
exchange for recognition as collective actors, cooperation at the 
workplace. From the perspective of labour organized as a class, erosion 
of the centred, bargaining level in the crisis amounts to a de-capitation 
of the workplace-based structures of interest accomodation whose 
functioning ceas.es to be controlled by, and conditioned upon, bargained 
agreements at the central level; instead it is secured and enforced by 
market pressures. In this sense, the de-conposition of comprehensive 
bargaining aggregates by exenptions and decentralization is nothing else 
but the very "return to tire market" that is at the core of tire neo­
liberal offensive against corporatist "rigidities". How much the crisis 
has changed, and even reversed, the situation in this respect is 
illustrated by the fact that in Germany in the prosperity of the 1960s 
arid 1970s, it was tire radical wing of the trade union movement that 
pressed, 'under the catchword of betriebsnahe Tarifpolitik, for 
exemptions in national agreements allowing for decentralized wage 
bargaining at tire level of individual finns. Today, exactly the sane 
demand is being put forward with increasing force by employers, and the 
very factions in tire unions that have once opposed centralization are 




























































































If by neo-corporatism we mean a system of collective industrial 
self-government in which significant elements of the employment 
relationship are negotiated, with state facilitation, between central 
organizations of capital and labour, then we would indeed predict that 
its stability is likely to be negatively affected by an economic crisis. 
But to. understand more profoundly the course aid the underlying dynanics 
of corporatist institutional decay, one has to get away from 
preconceived notions of "class interests" and take into account the 
irrpact of the crisis on employing firms. If "crisis" means a growing 
need for' fires to pay attention to more rapidly fluctuating and 
increasingly specific market signals - driving up dramatically the 
opportunity costs of conformity to established practices and general, 
"bureaucratic" rules - then the; pressure on neo-corporaU st institutions 
will originate first and foremost not from trade unions dissatisfied 
with the declining material benefits of centralized bargaining, but from 
capital trying to restore flexibility to the individual enterprise 
through, among other things, de-regulation of the labour market (similar 
dchrnitter, 1932: 277). Tills is not only because capital - or whoever 
has to make up for a firm's losses - is more sensitive to declining 
profits and more negatively affected by costly "institutional" 
rigidities than labour. It is also because where the market rules, 
capital - or management - rules, anu in this sense economic weakness 
constitutes a source of political strength for capital in its power game 
with labour.
In a nutshell, then, the stability of neo-corporatist industrial 
relations in an economic crisis depends essentially on the capacity of 
trade unions to defeat business offensives for a "return to the market", 




























































































of bargaining power trade unions suffer as a result of declining demand 
for labour, the chances of survival of neo-corporatist structures seem, 
to an important extent, determined by the support, unions as institutions 
receive: from the state and the lego], system. But even where such 
support is forthcoming, the outconie is far from certain. Trade unions 
trying to preserve corporatist institutions against the disintegrating 
impact of a crisis are faced not just with opposition from employers but 
also with internal opposition from their rank-and-file. Here, the 
"labour discontent" theory of corporatist decay is indeed valid. Where 
it goes wrong is that it assumes that the pressures inside unions that 
undermine the corjxjratist defenses vail come from radicalized militants. 
While r.ieniber revolts of this kind are always possible, they can safely 
be expec ted to remain isolated incidents in comparison to a development 
that represents, in many ways, their exact opposite: the integration of 
worker's at the level of individual enterprises in cooperative alliances 
with their employers. This, too, is a response to the market, and it 
reflects the fact that the relative insensitivity of corporatist- 
industrial unions to the market is much more a product of sophisticated 
institution building than an expression of a fundamental dissociation of 
the interests of labour from the functioning of the (capitalist) 
economy. V.hat the crisis does to organized labour is, in essence, that 
it makes the organizational transformation of specific economic into 
general "class" interests exceedingly more difficult (Carrieri and 
Hondo, 1983). Under crisis conditions, the rule of the market asserts 
itself not just over the behaviour of firms but also over the interest 
definitions of worker’s, with the latter's interests in the economic 
survival of "their" employer becoming so intense that they escape union- 




























































































and less inarke t-de terminée! interests. The emerging "wildcat 
cooperation" of individual workforces within workplace-based 
"productivity alliances" (Goldthorpe's "micro-corporatisrns", 1984)
parallels and reinforces, inside the organization of labour itself, the 
pressures from employers for a relaxation of corporatist controls over 
the workplace. Paradoxically, as will be shown below for the German 
case, such fragmentation aid differentiation of "class interests" among 
•workers may be facilitated by the very institutions of interest 
accomodation at the workplace that, in better times, provided an 
essential substructure of centralized joint regulation.
The prospects, summing up so far, for neo-corporatist industrial 
relations to weather ai economic crisis are uncertain. While economic 
decline does pose serious challenges to centralized class bargaining and 
interest accomodation, a.sudden breakdown of established practices and 
procedures appeal's unlikely given the considerable inertia mobilized by 
developed and long-standing institutional structures. The decay of neo­
corporatism, if decay there will be, is likely to be slow and creeping, 
proceeding step by step, over several years, from one gradual change to 
the other, until the institutional Gestalt may switch, and neo­
corpora cisn may finally give way to some other' mode of interest
politics. Whether or not this will happen, and how far' time involution 
of corporatist. institutions will go, seems to be determined by the 
strength of three countervailing forces :
- the legal backing by the state of existing neo-corporatist
structures;
- the resistance of central trade unions against a "downward




























































































- the cohesion of industrial unions as collective actors in the
- face of the centrifugal "pull" of the market on their membership.
In all three inspects, it is the unions whose behaviour, strategy 
v and capacity to act are decisive. Trade unions trying to defend neo-
corporatist institutions have to fight a war on two fronts: against
V
employers pressing for decentralization, and against members who are no 
longer willing to believe that centralized class politics can help them 
. keep their jobs. It is only if national and sectoral unions can
mobilize, both from the state and with state assistance, sufficent 
resources to prevail on both sides, that neo-corporatist industrial 
relations may Iiave a future.
Hie following two parts of this paper will illustrate in greater 
detail the external and internal pressures on trade unions trying to 
protect neo-corporatist institutions from the destabilizing impact of
C
the crisis. For- enpirical reference, the discussion will draw on West 
Germany, mainly because this is the country which the author knows best. 
Another, less idiosyncratic reason is that as a consequence of the legal 
institutionalization of workplace participation and cooperation in 
Germany - in the form of "co-determination" (Adams and Runxnel, 1977; 
otreeck, 1934) - changes in the relationship between the different 
levels of interest accomodation are easier to observe and to analyze in 
* this country than in others. Given the specificities of the German case
- e.g. the fact that West Germany has long been, and in soma respects 
continues to be, a "dominant economy" - one cannot expect that the 
German experience will be exactly replicated elsewhere. But it should 
be possible from this account to identify in general terms some of the 
problems for which trade unions in similar conditions have to find 



























































































their functions for the stability of centralized collective interest 
accomodation.
PfoTORIUG FLEXIBILITY TO A BAEGAIIffil) ECONOMY. IKE CASE OF ARBED 
SAAUBTAHL.
Since the beginning of the crisis in the late 1970s, there have 
been increasingly vocal complaints from both business and government on 
the rigidities imposed on the economy by central and uniform regulation 
of working conditions. Among the first to voice this new theme was the 
Council of Economic Advisors which repeatedly expressed its doubts over 
the wisdom of negotiating basically identical agreements for weak and 
strong industrial sectors or finns. Similar concerns were put forward 
by representatives of business, especially from the ranks of small and 
medium-sized finns who proposed exemptions from central agreements for 
the iiittelstand, and they were echoed even by a small nunber of union 
leaders from sectors like textiles that are espec.if.dly severely affected 
by the crisis. In 1982, the new government succeeded in breaking up, 
for the first time since the early 1960s, the industry-level bargaining 
unit of the civil service; rattier than, as had become established 
practice, automatically extending the wage settlement for employees in 
the public sector to the civil servants (Beamte) who have no right to 
colleclive bargaining, the government increased the salaries of civil 
servants at a rate below that of the industrial agreement.
Otherwise, however, apart from the fact that all new trade union 
projects for industry-level joint regulation have come to a standstill - 
e.g. in tiie crucial area of "protection against rationalization" - the 
large bargaining compacts that are characteristic of the West German 




























































































this is due to the strong support offered by the existing institutional 
and legal system to comprehensive, nationwide bargaining. Cn the other 
hand, there is at least one recent example shov/ing that, while the 
decomposition of "bloc bargaining" is exceedingly difficult, it is not 
inpossible even in the German context. Hie example, which is the case 
of ARBED Saarstahl, is instructive not least because it shows the 
extraordinary lengths to which the opponents of corporatist "rigidities" 
may have to go in a neo-corporatist environment in order to achieve 
their objectives.
Hie endemic crisis of trie West German steel industry is a subject 
of widespread attention, and it is not necessary here to present the 
details. (For a recent account, see Esser et al., 1933.) Hie re has 
long been agreement between government, industry and union (the IG 
detail) that a substantial reduction of capacity is inevitable, and tiiat 
the survival of the industry will not be possible without a considerable 
infusion of public subsidies. Ifo agreement exists, however, on the 
future structure of the industry. Although the crisis continued to 
deteriorate throughout 1S83, no coordinated restructuring effort was 
undertaken due to lack of consensus between, and within, the three 
parties.
Hie finn that is most severely affected by the crisis is ARBED 
G;i/ir.';l.'jhl. Formed in 1T/8 a:; a result of a government-sponsored merger 
(Esser et al., 1983: 91), ARBED is the only remaining major steel 
producer in the old industrial centre of the Saarland. Although the 
finn was never economically viable, both the Federal and the Saarland 
government felt they had no choice but to keep it alive through public 
subsidies. Unemployment at the Saar has always been above the national



























































































for redundant steel workers have failed. By 1982, ARBED had received no 
less than IX' 2.2 billion in subsidies (Esser et al., 1983: 94) without 
any substantial inprovenent in its condition.
Part of the public money was used to finance significant redundancy 
payments. Under a ''social plan" (Sozialplan) negotiated, corporatist- 
style, . between the union, the company and the government in 1978 (Esser 
cl: al., 1983: 90), employment reductions at ARBED are to be acconplished 
basically through natural wastage early retirement. Workers above age 
95 who accept an offer of eai'ly retirement are guaranteed 90 per cent of 
their last take-home pay, with the employer making up for the difference 
to the unemployment insurance benefits which anouit to 68 per cent. In 
addition, future wage increases received by tire remaining workforce are 
extended to the early retired workers. This agreement has contributed 
considerably to preventing social unrest and preserving social peace, 
and it was one of the cornerstones of the trilateral "pact" between 
capital, labour' and the state that emerged, in response to the crisis of 
the steel industry, in the 1970s: (Esser et al., 1983).
A first major conflict over the terms of crisis management arose in 
1982, shortly after the new Federal Governmenthad taken office. When 
ARBED came in for another subsicly of DM 310 million, the Ministry of 
Economics asked, as a precondition for further public support, for a 
B-jlcgtaCriofLaopfer - a "sacrifice" by the workforce contributing to the 
rescue of the firm (Esser et al., 1933: 94ff.) In particular, the 
voricforce v/as to accept a reduction of its Christmas bonus - equivalent 
to one monthly pay - by half. This would have saved the firm about DM 
GO million. However, the size of the bonus is fixed by the regional 
industrial agreement, and the IG Metall argued that since the agreement 




























































































the workforce and its elected representative, the works council. It 
soon turned out, however, that this position was not tenable. Under 
pressure from its members at ARBED who were afraid of the firm going 
bankrupt, the union - in order to protect at least the principle of wage 
regulation trireugh industrial agreement - proposed a re-negotiation of 
the agreement to the effect that one half of the 1983 and the 1984 
Christmas bonus were to be given, as an interest-free loan, to the firm. 
The money was to be paid back in 1985 and 1986. After an agreement to 
this effect was signed, the government agreed to provide the requested 
support.
A similar sequence of events occurred in the following year. In 
October 1983, the ARBED management proposed to the Federal Government a 
restructuring plan envisaging a workforce induction from 17,200 to 
12,100 by the end of 1936. Tie plan also asked for further subsidies 
anointing to a toted, of Dll 658 million for' the years from 1983 to 1985 
(MB, Oct. 14-15, 1983). In the ensuing negotiations, the government 
refused to commit itself to financial support beyond 1983 and 1984. It 
insisted that the proposed workforce reduction plan was fully 
implemented, and future subsidies were made conditional on this. It 
also made a number of additional demands which the management, given 
that the firm was only a few days short of bankiupcy, had no choice but 
to accept. Ailong other things, the members of the management board had 
to agree to a cut of their salaries by one quarter; they themselves had 
offered 17 per cent. More importantly, the government asked for another 
Belegschaf tsopfer, including significant cuts in the payments to 
redundant workers under the "social plan" and a commitment to a wage 
freeze (Nullrunde) in 1984 (FAZ, Nov. 9). To put pressure on both



























































































such an agreement was reached, no money would be forthcoming even if the 
firm load to go to the receiver.
Under the management restructuring plan, the 1984-1987 employment 
cut was to be effected again by early retirement of workers at age 55 
and older. But since not many workers of this age group were left, 
early retirement was to be offered also to "disabled" workers between 50 
and 55. However, as one condition of further subsidies, the Federal 
Government demanded that the guaranteed income of retired workers be 
lowered to 82 per cent, and this v/as to apply not just to worker’s 
affected by the impending employment reduction but also to those 
(former) workers; who were already receiving social plan payments.
Both works council and IG lie tall refused to accept. However, their 
position weakened as the breakdown of the firm came closer. The 
decisive Cabinet meeting was scheduled for November 7; if the government 
declined at this occasion to pay out the first installment of DM 84 
million, the firm would have had to declare bankrupcy the following day. 
In the week before the Cabinet meeting, the works council polled tire 
workforce on the 82 per cent offer; a result was not made public. 
However, a few days later the IG lietall agreed to let the matter go to a 
conciliation committee. Literally in the last minute, the committee, 
with the vote of its neutral chair (wo) man (the President of the Saarland 
Labour Administration) find against the works council and the union, 
ruled in favour of the 82 per cent offer made by the management. A  few 
hours later, the Federal Government agreed to pay the subsidy for 1983 
(FAZ, iJov. 9).
It soon turned out, however, that this was far from being the end 
of the matter. Formally, the conciliation committee decision applied 




























































































were to lose their jobs in the years until 1986. Since the existing 
social plan for workers between 55 and 60 was legally binding until 
December 1985 - and thus could have been changed only by mutual consent 
among works council and management - this was all the committee could 
do. It is an open question if the works council was willing, in later 
negotiations, to bring the terms of the existing social plan in line 
with the new one and with the demands of the Federal Government. But 
whatever potential for agreement may have existed, seems to have been 
destroyed by a parallel development on the second issue, the Nullrunde. 
This will be discussed shortly. By mid-November, unable to re-open 
negotiations on Ihe old social plan and responding to continuing 
government pressures, the management unilaterally suspended the existing 
regulations and reduced payments to early retired wor'kens above 55 to 82 
per cent. Union and works council, in turn, announced that they would 
take legal action (113, Nov. 17).
The second string the government had attached to its financial 
support was a wage freeze for* ARBED workers in 1984. Wages at ARBED 
are settled by an industrial agreement 'which is negotiated between the 
IG Net all and the Employers Association of the Iron and Steel Industry 
(Arbeibgeberverband Risen und Stahl Industrie) of which ARBED is a 
member. Although the steel industry is in pool' economic condition, tire 
industrial agroeinoiit. for 1984 Js likely to provide for' a small wage 
increase, probably at or slightly below the level of inflation. By the 
Lime the conciliation conniittee made its award, it became known that the 
government, in order to ensure that there would indeed be a Nullrunde at 
ARBED' in 1984, had made it a condition of further subsidies that ARBED 
resign from membership in tire enployers association, so as to be able to 




























































































days after the Cabinet meeting ARBED informed the Arbeitgeberverband of 
its intended resignation (FAZ, IIov. 12).
It is difficult at this stage to assess the implications of this 
event. For a start, it is not clear whether ARBED's forced resignation 
will not - just as, perhaps, the cut of the social plan - fall victim to 
the stickyness of the legal "rules of the game": formally, under the 
constitution of the employers association, the resignation does not 
become effective until the end of 1904 (HB, Nov. 15). Moreover, virile 
the association may be able to release ARBED earlier, it may not be 
v,ailing to do so. In an interview with the Handelsblatt on November 14, 
the director of the association criticized tire pressure by the 
government on ARBED as a "severe interference with the solidarity of 
the German steel industry" which was likely to make collective 
bargaining more difficult.. "Breaking a weak firm away from a bargaining 
unit is bound to lead to a higher settlement since the union will then 
demand more from the actually or reputedly stronger members". The 
convoy, he argued, now lead to travel without its slowest ship. If the 
other members acted according to the same logic, each firm could be 
"torpedoed by the union one by one" (HB, Nov. 15).
Other comments centered on the reasons why the government had 
demanded ARBED's resignation, and on tine consequences of this for ARBED 
itself. In principle, since the Saarland has a formally separate 
industrial agreement covering only ARBED and. two other, smaller firms, a 
wage freeze for ARBED could have been negotiated by the employers 
association as well as by ARBED itself. Although in the past two 
decades the Saar agreement has increasingly turned into a mere 
replication of the Ruhrgebiet agreement, it could conceivably have been 




























































































steal producers were unwilling to pay strike support - as they would 
have iiari to under the rules ox tlie association - to a competitor trying 
to win a "zero settlement'' while they themselves would have to accept a 
settlement "above zero" (M3, Nov. 11). Cn the other hand, as a non- 
member' ARMED will not get strike support either. Tne difference may be 
that where there is no question of outside support, the bargaining 
position of the union, faced with a firm on the verge of bankrupcy, may 
not improve but in fact deteriorate - assuming, of course, that the 
union and its AliBE'J membership want to avoid destroying the firm.
In any case, the strongest protests against the government's attack 
on "the solidarity of the German steel industry" came from the IG 
letali, and liad there still been a need to demonstrate the interest of 
industrial trade unions in strong employers associations, this would be 
a perfect example. According to the vice-chairman of IG letali, the 
government ' s pressure on A1TBED to resign from the association was "a 
blatant infringement on the constitutional freedom of association", 
aimed at abolishing the principle of free collective bargaining: "The 
Federal Government imposes, through conditions attached to subsidies, a 
wage Diktat. Tris is a clear violation of the constitutional rights of 
association and collective bargaining (MB, Nov. 21). For the union, 
ARBED repi.’esents an attempt by the government to create a precedent for 
furti !':r it i f< n v< t ii. i m  i:. of fi i i kind. il li:, applied already Lo the irrposed 
re-negotiation of the social plan. According to a union spokesman, the 
re— negotiation would save the company no more than DM 4 million a year, 
and what the government was really asking for was "a gesture of 
deference" by the union (MB, Nov. 17). This suspicion was felt to be 
confirmed when the resignation from the employers association was 




























































































that the re-negotiation of the social plan finally failed. rIhe newly 
elected chairman of IG Metall voiced his opposition to the government 
talcing future "zero settlements" for granted in restructuring projects 
(H3, Nov. 17). His deputy saw a strategy of the government to create 
"many little ARBEDs" and stated that the union would not allow this. By 
mid-November, IG Metall began to mobilize its membership, among other 
things by distributing two million copies of a special ARP,ED edition of 
its journal (HB, Nov. 17).
It is not inconceivable that the present government indeed uses 
AR3ED as an exercise ground for new strategies to undo, in response to 
and with the help of the crisis, the rigidities created by and inherent 
in a neo-corporatist system of industrial relations. That the approach 
chosen in 1983 did not attack the union directly but rather took a 
detour through the employers association is indicative not just of the 
considerable institutional strength of German trade unions - a strength 
that had proven itself even in 1982 when the IG lietall was able to turn 
the intended • cut of the Christmas bonus into a re-payable loan. It is 
also in line with the observation that the weaker pillar of neo- 
corporatism - weaker both in its organizational cohesion and in its 
interest-political corimitment. - is not labour but capital. It is true 
that in the ARBED case, die spiritus rector of the company's resignation 
from the employers association was the government. But this was due to 
trie fact that in the German steel industry, it has long become the 
government rather than private investors that pays the bills. Moreover, 
ARBED as a company is subject to the coal and steel type of co­
determination, which undoubtedly limits the capacity of its management 
to engage, without strong outside encouragement and backing, in 




























































































iias a greater stake and where management is still more autonomous and 
aggressive, anti-corporatist movements may as well emerge from business 
directly. Even so, however, government support will be vital for what 
neo-liberals would undoubtedly call the restoration of flexibility to a 
bargained economy, just as it iias been vital to the growth of 
centralised joint regulation in the l£6Qs and 1970s.
THE SSCttiPOSITICH OF CLASS 3MERE3T3. COI SEQUENCES OF UTE'-FLOYI-SInIT FOR 
TRADE Ul-Igl QRGANIZAT.T.OIJ.
Trie inpact of an economic crisis on trade unions is usually seen 
primarily in terms of a loss of bargaining power and, perhaps, of 
inenborship and financial resources.' Doth are direct and indirect 
consequences of high unenployment, and their inportance lies in the fact 
that they weaken unions in their relation with employers and government. 
But crisis and unenployuient have other consequences as well that affect 
the internal politics of trade ulions, and these may in the long run be 
even more subversive to neo—corporatist institutions tiian the 
deterioration of unions' market ixiwer.
Unemployment changes fundamentally the structure and the 
functioning of the labour* market. High unenployment is accompanied, and 
produced, not just by redundancies and dismissals but also by a sharp 
decline in tire number of new recruitments. In fact, the latter may be 
much more significant than trie former, especially in countries or 
industries where employment reductions are acconplished primarily 
through early retirement end the non-replacement of fluctuation, 
'workers in a crisis economy know that there is a higher chance than 
normal for them to lose their jobs by dismissal or as a result of their 




























































































all to find a new job once they have lost, or given up, their present 
one. It is difficult to say which of the two aspects of high 
unemployment has greater inpact on workers' "consciousness"; however, 
given that unemployment will always be limited to some, relatively 
small, proportion of the workforce while the disappearance of enployment 
alternatives affects nearly everybody, there is good reason to believe 
that it is the latter. Among other things, this is borne out by the 
fact that one of the most obvious effets of increasing unemployment is a 
decline in the number of voluntary resignations and in the mobility of 
workers between different enployers.
If it is true that a lasting crisis ties workers to their present 
place of enployment, then this should have a profound irrpact on both 
their definition of interest and, accordingly, the policy options open 
to their trade unions. • It iias often been observed that unerrployment 
tends to be accompanied by declining absenteeism, increased preparedness 
to work overtime or at higher speeds, fewer disciplinary problems, 
higgler acceptance of managerial authority, etc. Normally, this has been 
interpreted as a consequence of tire deteriorating power position, in 
relation to their employer, of individual workers faced with the 
disappearance of alternative employment opportunities, and there is no 
doubt that this plays indeed an irrportant part. But, in some cases at 
least, there is also another factor present which is an increased 
interest of workers, in an environment dominated by firm breakdowns and 
the absence of job openings, in the economic conpetitiveness and the 
survive! of the firm with which they are ' (still) errployed. This 
interest, newly discovered in the crisis and reinforced by the dismal 
state of the external labour market, can lead to, and in fact demand, a 




























































































the firm is in a critical condition in which its further existence may
be at stake.
V.hy should such a development affect the internal stability of the 
comprehensive and centralized trade unions that form an integral part of 
neo-corporatist industrial relations systems? The reason is essentially 
that a solidaristic, "class"-based union policy presupposes a labour 
market with high external mobility and., as a consequence, low 
identification of workers with the economic fate of their present 
employer. Trade unions undertaking to negotiate general standards of 
wages and working conditions that apply to an entire industry or economy 
cannot exhaust the "ability to pay" of the more prosperous enterprises, 
and this is why they have to fend off, in times of economic expansion, 
internal criticism by their more economically favoured members for being 
too moderate. But neither can they limit their demands to what marginal 
firms can offer without having to go out of operation. In fact, both 
the West German a;rd the Swedish trade union movement have, in the post­
war* era, entertained a doctrine of "wage policy" under which the 
bankrupey of marginal firms was seen not just as an inevitable but as an 
outright desirable result of centralized collective bargaining. This 
was possible only under the assumption that there was a functioning 
external labour market that could absorb into more productive einployment 
those workers who lost their jobs as a result of "solidaristic wage 
policy". (The rule of Swedish active labour market policy - which was 
invented by tire unions and instituted at their demand - was to ensure 
that the external labour iiarket could indeed perform this function; to 
present it, as some authors do, as a political compensation for "wage 
moderation", - cf. Lehnbr-uch, 1979: 306 - -would not go down well with 




























































































the part of the unions, this strategy required that workers in weak 
firms or regions did not side with their employers in order to defend 
their jobs, but vie re willing to support the demands of their union 
(their "class") even if as a consequence, they had to seek alternative 
employment.
Another case in which the members of industrial unions are asked to 
divorce their interests from those of their employer is strikes. For an 
industry-wide strike to be effective, a worker who is called upon to 
walk out must do so, even if he happens to have no particular grievance 
against his employer. He also must walk out regardless of whether this 
is likely to do lasting damage to his employer's competitive position or 
even to endanger his economic survived. That this is by no means a 
i merely hypothetical problem is indicated by the intense inside 
bargaining, behind closed, doors, between German national unions and 
(uniadzed) workforce representatives at individual workplaces on the 
maximum permissable level of "maintenance work" (Ifotdienst) during a 
strike. The same problem is present in the designation of targets for 
selective strikes which are, for financial reasons, the most suitable 
strike tactic for industrial unions. Again, one would expect that the 
willingness of workers to inflict damage on their erployer in tire 
support of class-wide, solidaristic interests is inversely related to 
the degree to which their own economic fate has become, as a result of 
a decline of the external labour market, inseparable from that of their 
erployer.
Identification of workers with the economic interests of their 
erployer can take various forms. One example is "employee bailouts", 
with workers in firms on the brink of bankrupcy accepting substantial 



























































































their employer. In. a country like the United States, this tends to be 
accorpanied by formal collective resignation from union membership, or 
by withdrawal of the bargaining ;nandate from the union. Developments of 
this kind, while they cannot be entirely precluded, are unlikely in more 
corporalist systems where collective agreements are more difficult to 
undercut and where tire status of ti'ade unions is better protected (a 
fact that is increasingly recognized by former critics of 
Verzechtlichung, cf. End, 1978, and End, 1933: 213). Here, enterprise 
centered interests of workers tend to articulate themselves less 
conspicuously and without dramatic institutional discontinuities. In 
the West German case, tlrey crystallize around tire existing institutions 
of the "’.-forks Constitution" which, as has been indicated, assumes new 
interest-political functions in tire course of tiro creeping erosion of 
the industry-wide bargaining system. The reason why these functional 
changes are both difficult to observe and almost irresistable is that 
they represent basically an acceleration of trends that have been 
present for some time and that have started long before the crisis 
(Streeck 1381a). Nevertheless, the changes that are under way are 
fundamental in t’na.t they involve a gradual transformation of 
institutions that once formed an indispensable substructure of 
centralized joint regulation, into nuclei of an emergent enterprise 
unionism - not necessarily in a formal and official sense but, more; 
likely, de facto under tine cover of the existing but functionally 
preempted institutional struccure.
Workers in Germany are represented at the workplace by works 
councils which are formally not trade union bodies but elements of the 
legal-based "'.forks Constitution". ’forks councils are elected every 



























































































unions can nominate candidates, they may hiave to compete with candidates
from non-union groups. Nevertheless, the industrial unions affiliated 
to the Deutscher Geweiicsschaftsbund (German Federation of Trade Unions) 
regularly win about eighty per cent of all works council seats. Works
council members are entitled to be released from work for the♦
performance of their function, and the employer has to provide them with 
office space and other material resources. They also have wide-ranging 
legal rights to "co-determination", especially in the area of manpower 
use and manpower policy. But works councils have no right to take 
industrial action, and they are under a legal obligation to cooperate 
with the enployer in the best interests of the firm.
The positive functions of the Works Constitution for industrial 
unionism have been pointed out elsewhere in detail (Streeck, 1979). 
Since works councils, ■ having a de facto monopoly on interest 
representation at the workplace, are elected at large, they prevent the 
articulation of sectional interests of fractions of the workforce - e.g. 
specific "craft" occupations. They thus relieve the industrial union of 
problems of interest aggregation that otherwise might be unsoluable. 
Furthermore, works councils are legally cliarged with supervising the 
implementation of industrial agreements. Moreover, the prohibition on 
works councils calling strikes protects the "strike monopoly" and, with 
it, the bargaining monopoly of industrial unions; without such
protection, the difficulties of external unions in keeping workers in 
firms with an above-average "ability to pay" from negotiating their own 
agreements would seem unsunnoun table. The role of the Works
Constitution as an organisational substructure of industrial unionism 
was considerably strengthened by the Works Constitution Act of 1972 



























































































inevertheless, while the V/orks Constitution helped unions solve a 
wide range of organizational problems, it also created new ones. 
Independent action of privileged or radicalized sections of the 
membership, which is referred to as "syndicalism" in German trade union 
language, the works council system controls effectively. But in 
addition to the conflictual type of syndicalism, there always was 
anotiler, cooperative one - Detriebsegoismus - and this trie V/orlrs 
Constitution not only fails to control but indeed encourages (Xotthoff, 
1972; Killer, 1982; Tegt.neier, 1973; Teschner, 1977). The problem is 
not so much that works councils nay fail to use their full legal powers; 
in such cases, trade unions have ways ana means to intervene. More 
i.rportant is the case in which they do use their powers, but for 
objectives that differ from union policy. For example, the works
council of a large firm may negotiate a supplementary pension plan or a 
co-ownership scheme - both seen with suspicion by the union - conceding 
to management in exciirxige tiie introduction of a new kind of job 
classification or of a manpower information system that the union is 
trying to prevent througn action at the sectoral level. The common 
political denominator ex' such bilateral agreements at enterprise level 
is the shared interest of management and v/orks council in the economic 
success of "their" enterprise - as distinguished from competing firms 
and the incur.!,ry ;i whole. Tn fact, given dial works councils
organize workers on the basis of their being employed with one specific 
employer, the identification of the collective interest they represent 
with the (long-term) interest of the firm seems so natural that the 
leg-il obligation to "peaceful cooperation" appears almost unnecessary.
It has been suggested as early as in the late 1970s that the works 
i, having been so considerably strengthened in 1972 and
- 23 -




























































































further by the Co-Determination Act of 1976, nay at some stage turn into 
a liability, rather than an asset, for the stability of industrial 
unionism (Streeck, 1982: 73). But what a few years ago was visible only 
to a few close observers, is now' becoming increasingly obvious. If one 
had to design an ideal institutional structure in which to accomodate 
the epiergent, workplace-specific interests of workers in a crisis 
econorny, this could not conceivably look much different from the present 
Works Constitution. With diminishing control of central collective 
bargaining over the exercise of co-hetermination at the workplace, the 
last remaining criterion of decision-making and interest accomodation 
inside the institutions of the Works Constitution becomes the well-being 
of the firm. hot that labour had lost its voice; if it had, the 
specific kind of cooperation tliat is so characteristic of large German 
firms - and that is based on the confidence of workers that they can 
indeed get a share of the proceeds - would not be possible. But the 
voice of labour is now more than ever tliat of those employed, and 
wanting to remain employed, in a specific place of -work, and it is their 
interest, highly particularistic from a class perspective and no longer 
contaminated by organizationally enforced "solidarity", that puts to its 
own use the institutional instruments of workplace participation that 
were created in the past for- other, more general purposes.
At the heart of the new Betriebsegoismus of works councils, as one 
v/ould expect given the state of the external labour market, lies 
employment protection. But this is very widely defined, coriprising both 
the full utilization of existing legal safeguards and cooperation with 
management in maintaining and improving the firm's competitive position. 
The institutional structure of the Works Constitution permits both at 




























































































under co-determination, on tine cooperation of the works council, the 
works council is well enough protected from sectional pressures from the 
labour foiee - and from trace union pressure as veil - to be able to 
cooperate and "deliver" its constituents. The political formula on 
which this kind of interest accomodation is based is closure of the 
internal labour" iriarket in exchange for the highest possible measure of 
internal flexibility, with the worics council .accepting responsibility 
for* continuous adaptation of an essentially fixed workforce to changing 
teciinical and economic needs (Hohn, 1333). In some instances, this may 
involve errployrnent cuts. But tire considerable powers of worlds councils, 
and the six eng hold they have on firms’ personnel departments under 
board-level co-deten,iination (Bl.reeck, 193-"'!), has led to the development, 
of manpower planning systems that often permit to stretch workforce 
reductions over a relatively long period of time, so that they can be 
accoirplished by natural wastage and early retirement.
Otherwise and in tiro nonnal case, works councils become the border 
guards and, indeed, the rulers of the internal labour market, ensuring 
that nobody is allowed in who might in the future threaten tire 
errployrnent status of those already employed. The latter may liappen in 
two ways (Holm, 1983; Hohn and Windolf, 1932). Hew recruitment may lead 
to an ovo.. •sized workforce which may later have to be again reduced, and 
tire larger the rrui.ibor of workers to be made redundant, the more 
difficult it is to avoid forced dismissals. Consequently, overtime is 
much preferred by works councils over' new recruitment as a way of coping 
with additional workloads, arid workforces remain small and "lean". 
Also, recuitment of workers who are unable or unwilling to undergo 
future refraining aid redeployment may make it more difficult for the 



























































































employment security; in addition, it may negatively affect the firm's 
economic performance. In these areas as well as in others - e.g. in the 
selection of workers for retraining or in the invention of payment 
scheiiies allowing for frictionless redeployment - works councils under 
co-do termination have taken over essential functions of manpower 
management. Partly, this transfer of responsibility was a matter of 
legal entitlement; but it often was also a result of voluntary 
delegation by management itself, leaving the problem of making stable 
employment conpatible with economic performance to those who are most 
strongly'- interested in trie former while knowing that for this very 
reason, they have to be also interested in the latter.
As (co-)managers of internal labour markets (Streeck, 1984), works 
councils may find central industrial agreements as "rigid" and 
"iirpractible" as management. But being legally charged with supervising 
their enforcement, they can more easily circumvent them. Since their 
leading members normally wield considerable power inside the union, they 
also can influence sectoral and national trade union policy so that it 
does not get in their way. The impasse of central collective bargaining 
in the crisis is bound to increase their autonomy and discretion even 
further. In fact, there is very little today that can prevent works 
councils from giving precedence to internal labour market flexibility 
over trade union policy. Particularly interesting examples are found in 
tire area of working time. In spite of the vigorous opposition of 
industrial unions to part-time work, job sharing and flexible working 
time according to production requirements, works councils in several 




























































































Apart from a snail number of radical outsiders, there is no demand 
on the part of business for a repeal of the V/orks Constitution Act, and 
the new government lias formally stated that it has no such intention. 
In part, this is because any atter.pt to abolish the Works Constitution 
may end up in industrial civil war. But it is also true that the Works
Constitution, left on its own, is the one element of neo-corporatism 
that business can accept. 'The delegation of managerial responsibilities 
to a cooperative woris council has proven an effective instrument of 
preserving social peace at the point of production in a period of 
intensive industrial restructuring. Moreover, the internal labour 
market option favournd by works councils, provided that it is made 
viable through bargained, binding interest accomodation, seems to be 
well adapted to the new technologies and new forms of work organization 
necessary for survival in tighter and more volatile markets. Here, the 
Japanese example looms large In the background. If employment stability 
and co-determination help create a workforce that is highly qualified, 
•willing to undergo continuous re-training, motivated to do quality work, 
prepared to accept flexible work schedules, able to switch between 
different jobs with broad and frequently changing tasks, self-interested 
in suggesting improvements that increase productivity, and capable of 
operating a work organization based on semi-autonomous groups - then 
they are worth their price, and managerial unilatoralism, combined with 
a reassert.; on of the rigjvt to "hire and fire", may well be the inferior 
strategy. Here again, like in the neo-corporatism of the 1970s, but 
tiiis time at the level of individual firms, a "virtuous circle" may 
e.ierge within which an institutional system whose stability depends on 




























































































For the unions, of course, the gradual "Japanization", if the term 
is permitted, of German industrial relations in the crisis is nothing 
less than the most serious organizational challenge they have ever 
faced. The longer the crisis lasts, the more difficult it is to imagine 
that tire emerging pattern of social partnership without corporatism (cf. 
Hiller, 1982: 45) inside the large, world-market oriented enterprises 
can again be undone in the name of class solidarity. The danger for 
national trade union headquarters to degenerate into service 
organizations (ausgelagerte Stabe) for the powerful works councils of 
large enterprises - providing them at their request with legal and 
economic advice instead of directing their policies - has been pointed 
out by this author in the past (Streeck, 1981b; 1982). Today, it is 
clear that this development has progressed much faster than had been 
expected. The preparations presently made by IG Me tall for a nation- 
wide strike in 1984 in support of a reduction of the standard working 
week to 35 hours and a limitation of overtime can in this perspective be 
interpreted as a monumental effort to reclaim, for, the central 
bargaining level, the initiative on a wide range of subjects, in 
particular manpower policy and manpower planning, that are presently 
dealt with exclusively at the enterprise level under co-determination. 
Heroic as this strategy is, it is more likely to fail than to succeed. 
Hvoi'i if the union were to win significant concessions from the employers 
- which is extremely unlikely - it is highly questionable whether such 
concessions will actually be implemented at the ’workplace. In at least 
one large enterprise - which is among the largest in the Federal 
Republic - the works council is already today looking for ways to 
prevent a general reduction of working time from negatively affecting 



























































































coupon/. One solution that is being .corrsidered is to eliminate breaks 
tlrat irad in the past been introduced by voluntary agreement between 
varies council and management, so as to minimize t'ne reduction of 
effective working time. /another is the introduction of flexible time 
schedules responding to changing workloads ("guaranteed yearly working 
time"). A third is continued operation of industrial robots during 
'creaks, ana there are more such proposals. Tnere is reason to believe 
that tire autonomy, the sophistication and the sense of separate identity 
of bargaining systems at the workplace have by now far exceeded the 
control capacity of the traditional industrial agreement.
NEW L U E S  OF CLEAVAGE.
'.There will all this lead? As we leave beiiind the 1960s and 1970s, 
tiie defenders of -the grand simplicity and the elegant unity of the neo- 
corporatist institutional design are becoming smaller in number, and
their resistance is weakening. Certainly tire present, and most likely 
the future as well, is dominated by growing divergence of interests that 
orreo were contained inside tire big neo-corporatist aggregates. As a 
result, the problems facing their private goverrrments in what we have 
called, elsewhere, tire "management of interest diversity" (Schrnitter and 
Gtroeck, 1981) are becoming ever «ore difficult to resolve. It is not
just business Ural, feels temp led today to abandon tire historical project
of regulating a complex labour market by centralized, negotiated
accomodation of interests - although business clearly has tire strongest 
motivation to do so. Governments, especially those of a conservative 
political complexion, may also become impatient with the costs and the 
slow pace of bargained industrial restructuring. Only the unions seem 




























































































special interests from each other does not stop at their doorsteps, and 
national unions' may increasingly find themselves fighting for a cause 
that their members have long begun to desert.
Inside aid outside existing neo-corporatist institutions and often 
behind their cover, new lines of cleavage are emerging that do not look 
like .they would soon disappear (Goldthorpe, 1984). Five such cleavages 
rire making themselves felt with growing strength:
1. Tne division between workers in weak and strong sectore. As 
long as there was enough slack in the economy, the negative inpact on 
weaker industries of central, encompassing regulation of the labour 
market was comparatively easy to accept. Ilot only were there 
alternative employment opportunities for workere f/om declining sectors. 
There also was the possibility of using a share of the proceeds of a 
growing econory to finance an *’orderly retreat" from declining 
industries, buying the necessary time for "socially acceptable" 
structural adaptation. All this lias changed now. The external labour 
market is closed; state budgets are overspent; even the strong sectors 
need all they can get for their own survival; and the slow and soft 
"fnanagement of decline" of yesteryear' has given way to the brute reality 
of employment cuts and banlcrupcies on short notice. For workers in the 
weak sectors of the economy - not to mention their employers - a 
"sblidai'istLc" trade union policy that tries to override specific market 
forces may, in these circumstances, appear rather frightening, and trade 
unions sticking to the time-honoured principles of class solidarity may 
ever more often be asked by their members in crisis-ridden sectors to be 
left an their own.
2. fie division between v/orkere in weak and strong firms. 



























































































be created for other vrorkers by their employersprecedents to
undercutting national agreements. But this presupposes that, in return, 
there can be a meaningful transfer of bargaining power from the strong 
to the weak. To the extent that the central bargaining level loses its 
significance, and adherence to the national agreement may for workers in 
weak firms result in lasting unemployment, this condition is no longer 
given, and structural differences of interest arise that are more
difficult than ever to bridge by normative concepts like "solidarity".
3. Tne division between workers in large and small firms. Firm
size has always made a difference with regard to the effectiveness of 
representation of workers at the workplace. Tins holds in particular in 
the German context where the influence of works councils depends on 
nod ling more than the size of the firm. To a large part, solidaristic 
trade union policy in West Germany was aimed at spreading, through the 
instrument of tire collective agreement, some of the concessions won by 
workers in large firms through theii' works councils, to the workforce as 
a whole. The more the neo--corporatist institutions at the industrial 
and national level fall into disuse, the more this mechanism of 
redistribution comes to a halt. As the institutional structures of
interest accomodation at the wor! place become "de-capitated", tire 
division in tens J fies between 'workers in large firms who continue to have 
.x voice in the marvi;-.onient of their affairs, and workers in small iimis 
that fail to sustain effective structures of workplace representation.
4. Tne division oetween workers in competing production units.
Labour' can organize and act as a class only if in the perception of 
workers, the political cleavage between them and "capital" supersedes 
the "market cleavage" between their present employer and its




























































































on class rather than firm was never easy for trade unions, but the 
changing structure of the labour market in the crisis has compounded the
problem. Solidaristic trade union strategy demands that workers stay 
neutral in the struggles that their employers fight with each other in 
the marketplace. However, if the number of jobs in an industry is 
declining, and the only alternative to one's present job is 
unemployment, there is a considerable incentive for workers and their 
worlqjlace representatives to help their employer prevail and thereby 
shift the burden of unemployment to their fellow workers who happen to 
work for the competition. A related case, which has become rather 
frequent in West Germany, is firms with overcapacity cancelling 
contracts with suppliers and changing to inhouse production, as a wsy of 
protecting their employment. Often, this is in response to demands by 
the works council - which.are made regardless of the fact that they are
in contradiction to official trade union policy.
5. The division between the "ins” and tire "outs". It has often 
been argued that the "segmentation" of labour markets is to a 
significant degree produced by trade union intervention. But while this 
was always highly plausible where unions are workplace- or craft-based, 
industrial unions aspire to represent all workers equally, including 
those who are not organized. As has been said, this is one reason why 
they find it so difficult to resist tire "rreo-corporatist temptation". 
However, with the center of gravity of industrial relations shifting to 
the workplace, it is no longer the industrial union but increasingly the 
worlcs councils that represent labour in the joint regulation of the 
"conditions of employment", and this, indeed, does result in 
segmentation (I John, 1983). But the pattern of segmentation in an



























































































ins t.i tutional structure from whose decay it originates, differs from
that Ln systems chat never were corporatist. For example, the German 
employment system is relatively inflexible with regard to the 
introduction of unequal wages and conditions for new entrants into a 
given wor’cforce; tills is different from the United States where 
agreements between (workplace) union and management are becoming more 
widespread under which new workers are paid only part of the wage of 
already employed workers. Also, segmentation in Germany is not caused 
by declining access to training for- skilled occupations; to the 
contrary, the number of apprentices in large firms has been increasing 
in recent years, not least duo to works council pressure. (In exchange, 
wor'es councils have agreed that skilled workers upon completion of their 
apprenticeship way be employed in unskilled jobs, until the internal 
labour market offers an opportunity for promotion). And vhile there 
always was some discrimination by ascriptive criteria, the main line of
segmentation in German "late corporatism'' is between those who are 
employed one’ those who are not - and cannot Ire, even at inferior 
conditions, because this would undermine the defense at workplace level 
of the past acconplishnents of solidaristic union policy. Thus, to the 
extent that there is a contribution of organised labour to labour market 
segmentation in best Germany, this consists primarily of the successful 
■ rfoi of wor d. ; <.-osmevi h ;, us a way of protecting the existing
woricfo.ce, to control, and in effect prevent, new recruitment (Holm, 
19C3). One expression of the resulting "social closure" of internal 
labour murne cs — whi.cn is facil -L VyciLCh* OV or re absense of formal seniority 
rules and job demarcations, allowing for high internal flexibility 
through retraining and redeployment - is the higji level of overtime in 




























































































violates the principle of solidarity with the unemployed, for those who 
are in employment it is an essential precondition of their continued 
employment security.
Undoubtedly, the German case is special as is every other case. 
Just as there was no "coorporatist convergence" in the 1970s 
(Goldthorpe, 1304), there is not likely to be a "post-corporatist 
convergence" in the 1930s. Some countries, especially smaller ones like 
Austria and Sweden, may be able to sustain corporatist industrial 
relations structures in spite of the crisis. Hie Swedish "wage-earners 
funds" can be seen as an attempt to collectivize, at the sectoral level, 
workers growing "property interests" in their places of employment, and 
this may indeed help both stabilize industrial unions and protect the 
role of industry-wide joint regulation. Qi the other ha id, the 1982 
break-up of the machinery.of inter-sectoral wage setting indicates that 
even the Swedish system is by no means insensitive to the centrifugal 
forces generated by the crisis.
Latecomers to corporatism may also be in a different situation, 
al though Italy seems to be the only country today in which the project 
of an institutionalized, tri-partite "social contract" ranks hi go on the 
national agenda. Its success, it seems, depends on the existence, on 
the part of both capital and labour, of tradeable political commodities 
that can be exchanged ovet: a longer' period to mutual advantage. Here, 
the picture does not in the end much differ- from that in Germany. While 
the Italian labour movement seems to be prepared to make significant 
material concessions in return for stronger collective participation in 
industrial restructuring, the capacity of trade unions to control the 




























































































Capital, on the other hand, seems to be interested above all in de­
regulation of the labour market, and there must be little attraction for 
it in displacing state-bureaucratic regulation by regulation through 
national or sectoral collective bargaining. It appears that the same 
fundamental mismatch of interests tiiat undermines established 
corporatist systems - what unions have to offer, employers already have,
and what employers need, unions with a corporatist project cannot offer 
also, and even more effectively, stifles the development of
corporatist institutions where they have, not previously existed.
The parallels, of course, must not lead one to overlook the 
differences. In Italy, precisely because it is a case of pre- rather 
than post-corporatism, there is no "cooperative trap" at the workplace 
in which industrial unions could fall, 'flic most likely scenario here 
appears to oe a lasting institutional inpasse, with management ruling 
the day at the point of production while unions, outside and above the 
individual enterprise, remain able, to conserve their political and 
organizational integrity for a future resurgence of traditional class 
conflict (which may however not occur for a long time). German unions, 
by coii pari son, are much better protectee fromn a return to managerial
unilateraliaa, at least in the larger workplaces, but for this they pay 
wi tii their organizational unity and with the emergence of new cleavages 
with which their structures, strategies and ideologies do not mesh. 
Paradoxically, the transformation of German neo-corporatisin into an 
emergent enterprise unionl sm-cu n-dual ism is to a large part a
consequence of the former's past economic success - much as the 
inmobilism of the Italian pre-corporatist structure is explained by its 
economi-C failure. The cooperative syndicalism of German works councils 




























































































underlay the "i-Iodell Deutschland" of die 1970s; it is sustained by the 
experience, absent in Italy, that such corrpetitiveness can in fact be 
successfully pursued, but it also reflects the recognition that the 
conditions for this have changed. Hie losers are the trade unions at 
the industrial level. that is striking about the resulting 
institutional structure is how close it conies to that in the two other 
leading capitalist nations, Japan and trie United States (cf., for 
example, the recent break-up of pattern bargaining in the US automobile 
industry). Effective consensual interest accomodation at the level of 
individual enterprises seerns to be a crucial institutional precondition 
of success in today's world markets, and Germany may be the one 
corporatisl country that is best equipped for a transition to this 
pattern. Some counlries, like Sweden and Austria, may be able to 
protect their prosperity, without going just as far; but others, like 
Italy, France or Britain, which liave never developed a corporatist 
structuie on whose fragnents they could build stable, enterprise-based 
"productivity coalitions", are likely to suffer a lasting disadvantage 
in relation to countries with more competitive institutions.
Trying to draw out the lines of recent German developnents, the 
joint regulation of the relations between capital and labour may for a 
long time effectively shift from the national or industrial to the 
enterprise level. Hie dominant pattern here, dominant in the sense that 
It prevails in the leading sectors and firms of the economy, seems to be 
one of close, and closed, "productivity coalitions" within individual 
production units, joining together management and a relatively secure, 
"fixed" v/orkforce in a campaign for competitive success on domestic and 
world markets (Streeck, 1S84). It is tempting to speculate what the 



























































































GKploymerit contracts; in an open external labour market, to 
institutionally protected job ownership in closed industrial sub­
societies. Cue possibility, given the forceful emergence and the 
sustained precedence of "fixed", static interests of workers in the 
economic fate of "their" enterprise, would be a gradual transformation 
of job ownership into share ownership. In fact, this would seem to be 
no more than the logical' conclusion of the past evolution, much assisted 
by neo-corpora;ist collective bargaining and legislation, from contract 
to status, as the defining principle in the .relationship between workers 
and their employing organization. With the workforce acquiring a 
similarly vested interest in' the success of the firm as the original 
shareholders, there is no reason why vjorkers should be represented 
exclusively through traditional institutions of industrial relations, 
and not (also) directly in the shareholders' assembly. Wot only would 
share ownership give adequate institutional expression to the specific 
relation of a fixed workforce to "its" enterprise in a closed external 
labour market; it would also permit for considerable upward and downward 
flexibility of remuneration uninpeded by industrial agreements and in 
line with both the enterprise's ability to pay and its need to survive.
Ileo-corporatism may not di sappear1, even though it seems to have 
given rise to a new enterprise constitution which, under changed 
economic condition:.;, unden. lines tiie neo-corporatist institutional 
pattern of industrial relations. If one was daring enough, one might 
venture hie hypothesis that it is industrial relations as we have known 
it, and not neo-corporatism, that is about to wither away. With tiie 
cleavage between labour and capital as organized social classes being 
superseded by the new cleavages between unified sectors end consensually 



























































































sections, new issues like the protection and the res true turing of 
industrial sectors will take precedence. These may well again lend 
themselves to iieo-corporatist forms of interest intermediation and 
public policy-making. On the other hand, however, indications are that 
she interests aid actors called upon by the new issues will be much more 
fragmented and specific than in the hi^ily organized labour market of 
the past. Itoreover, for each of the new corporatist policy arenas - if 
corporatist they will ’re - t;here will also be outsiders challenging the 
legitimacy of state-facilitated interest accomodation between those who 
have been admitted as participants. If ever the institutional 
simplicity and the political comprehensiveness of neo-corporatist 
industrial relations was more than just a delusion, with the 
entanglement of class politics in the economics of individual firms and 
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